

A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL AND TYPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATE SYSTEM

Taking Stein Rokkan's Ambitions
Beyond Europe

Edited by Lars Mjøset, Nils Butenschøn
and Kristian Berg Harpviken

COMPARATIVE SOCIAL RESEARCH

VOLUME 36

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AND TYPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATE
SYSTEM

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COMPARATIVE SOCIAL RESEARCH VOLUME 36

**A COMPARATIVE
HISTORICAL AND
TYPOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO THE MIDDLE EASTERN
STATE SYSTEM: TAKING
STEIN ROKKAN'S
AMBITIONS BEYOND
EUROPE**

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INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

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PREFACE

Lars Mjøset, Nils Butenschøn and Kristian Berg Harpviken

Editing this volume, our inspiration has been Stein Rokkan's (1921–1979) work on state formation and nation building.

Presently, this research field is hampered by a gap between the single-case historical orientation of area studies (mostly in humanities faculties) and the generalizing studies based on large datasets pursued in social science (political science, sociology). Discussions across that gap seem trapped in a vicious cycle where each side is preoccupied with identifying the shortcomings of the other rather than engaging in constructive interchange of ideas. The 'state of the art' is divided: several country-related research frontiers on the humanities side are countered on the social science side by a plethora of formal conceptual frameworks that are insufficiently grounded in historical case studies.

At the time of his death in 1979, Stein Rokkan had developed the skeleton of a methodology that promises to bridge this gap. Chapter 1 in this volume contains the first English translation of Rokkan's 1976 Paris lecture, the broadest and most popular overview he ever gave of his approach to comparative history. Rokkan spoke up for a particular type of comparative historical macro-sociology, which is solidly rooted in case studies, but still employs lists of explanatory factors that can be combined in conceptual-typological maps which account for the variation in patterns of state formation both within specific historical periods and over time.

Commentators on Rokkan's work have not been sufficiently aware of the inherent promise of this methodology. They have dealt with Rokkan's latest work (in the 1970s) as a contribution to the comparative history of state formation and nation building in Western Europe only. In our view, Rokkan did more than that: he contributed a set of methodological tools that allow for the construction of typologies, models and maps that can aid the comparative study of state formation and nation building in any world region. In this perspective, Rokkan's work on Western Europe can be seen as the calibration – or regional specification – of such a set of methodological tools, using empirical material on Western European historical developments over the long term. His key insight was that relevant models and maps cannot be developed by means of formal concepts alone; concepts must be grounded in knowledge about the specific history of the region and its components.

Since Rokkan's main innovation was regional models, methodological improvements must be linked to both theoretical and empirical efforts. Rokkan's argument matches the insight that middle range or grounded theories dominate in any branch of social science that aims at explaining specified outcomes. Since

states are huge and complex units, workable models and maps of state formation and nation building must be grounded in thorough studies of the regional historical context. Regional models and maps can only be developed by moving back and forth between a conceptual framework and sketches of historical explanations that employ comparisons of empirical processes leading to the outcomes under study. By reconstructing and upgrading Rokkan's methodology, we hope to show how the unfortunate gap in our fields can be mended.

Lars Mjøset's Chapter 2 situates Rokkan's approach in the framework of recent methodological contributions on the differences between variables- and case-oriented social science. Chapter 4, by Mjøset, Butenschøn, Harpviken and Meijer, tries to pursue Rokkan's research program, given the qualifications in Chapter 2, in a comparative analysis of 20 Middle Eastern states in the period between the 1870s and the 1920s.

The rest of the papers in this volume relate to Rokkan's work in different ways, even if they are not directly based on the framework presented in Chapters 2 and 4. In Chapter 3, Knut Vikør compares two pairs of Maghreb states, adding three Mashreq cases (Egypt, Iraq and Syria). He does not explicitly relate to Rokkan's methodology, but the seven-case comparisons he presents – grounded in deep knowledge of the relevant historical literature – have many elements that are parallel to Rokkan-style comparisons. In Chapter 5, Rania Maktabi analyzes citizenship and divorce laws in four Maghreb states (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), relating Rokkan's early work with R. Bendix to more recent conceptual frameworks. In Chapter 6, Julia Palik analyzes the roles played by Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Yemen conflict in line with George and Bennett's method of structured, focused comparison, a procedure that has many parallels to Rokkan's approach.

Chapters 7–10 make up a book symposium devoted to Ahmet Kuru's *Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment* (2019), a study that emphasizes common traits in all Muslim countries. Two review articles, by Knut Vikør and Roel Meijer, raise questions about the absence of comparative perspectives and suggest alternative explanatory strategies. In his rejoinder, Kuru replies to his critics.

All the papers in this volume pursue qualitative, case-based analysis, often using tables to systematically explicate conceptual specifications, summarize strategies of comparative analysis, draw up typological maps, list dates of historical events and/or provide compilations of relevant indicators and facts. It should be noted that unless otherwise specified, these tables are not copied from other sources, but represent the original work of the authors, published here for the first time.

The contributions to this volume came out of two workshops entitled 'The Transformation of the State System in the Middle East'. The first was hosted at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, 3–4 December 2018. The second was hosted at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 28–29 November 2019. All contributions are based on presentations at the workshops. All but two of the article authors were workshop presenters. All articles, with the exception of the Rokkan lecture, have been peer reviewed.

The editors are grateful to their host institutions for supporting this endeavor, to all who contributed to the workshops (also the many whose papers are not part of this volume), to the reviewers for contributing greatly to the quality of the works as they appear here and to the staff at Emerald publishers who tolerated a series of last-minute delays on the part of the editors.

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CHAPTER 1

A FAMILY OF MODELS FOR EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE HISTORY

Paris Lecture 4th December 1976¹

Stein Rokkan[†]

Translated by Lars Mjøset

ABSTRACT

Stein Rokkan (1921–1979) gave this lecture in Paris, 4th December 1976. Comparative Social Research here publishes the first English language translation of Rokkan's manuscript for the lecture, which was given in French. The lecture was earlier only available in German (published 1980) and Norwegian (published 1921) translations. The lecture presents the sequence of models that Rokkan developed for his Europe-project aiming to explain the variations between 16 Western European democracies with reference to rights, party systems and systems alternatives. It is the only extensive intellectual autobiography that Rokkan ever wrote.

Keywords: Historical sociology; comparative method; state formation; typologization; Europe; Stein Rokkan

I am very appreciative of the honour conferred on me by the French Political Science Association by this invitation to deliver the keynote speech on this day devoted to problems of comparative political research in Europe.

[†]Deceased

Ever since my stay in Paris 1948–1949, I have maintained close contact with French political science. I got to know Jean Maynaud – who died much too young – and I caught an interest in systematic comparison.² I am very happy that it was possible to organize this discussion with my French colleagues. I am convinced that there is much for me to learn and that your criticism will be very helpful when I continue to work out further versions of my comparative explanatory schemes.

This study day has a double goal: it will help us better to recognize the possibilities and limitations of certain *models* in comparative politics, and at the same time, it gives us an occasion to discuss progress in the organization of the empirical *data* that will confront these models. This morning, I will try to explain to you the intellectual genealogy of a series of models that I have developed in my comparative research on Western Europe. You will immediately see that they are sketches, attempts, drafts. I have published a number of versions of these models, but I have never remained satisfied with what I developed. Once one version was published, I was struck by new logical or empirical difficulties that forced me to work further, rethinking the structure of concepts and variables. This has not led to a closed and finished theoretical construction. Quite the contrary, I am increasingly convinced that this work is a long term undertaking, which takes the form of a never-ending dialectical confrontation between generative explanatory attempts and hard, ruthless historical and sociological data.

So far, I have not contributed much to this process of interaction. I have developed some schemes, but I have never had the time nor the energy to push the analysis towards a complete systematization of the possible combinations implicit in these schemes. I have to admit that I never could, and never would, devote all my time to confront these theoretical difficulties. I have found a more immediate pleasure in concrete and local research, organizing and analyzing empirical data pertaining to my own country, Norway, or to other systems taken separately. This afternoon, I will speak about my work with brute research data. I direct a Norwegian project that aims to digitalize a large amount of historical statistics, district by district, and since 1971 I publish the newsletter of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) on the collection and organization of basic data for political research in the various Western European countries.³ To me, the essence of political research resides in the dialectical back and forth between the construction of models and organization of data, between intellectual truth and empirical resistance.

How was it that I came to be occupied with these problems of political comparisons? I think it is useful to provide some details from my intellectual biography. I am convinced that you will understand the structure of my schemes better if I explain to you how I came to be occupied with problems of systematic comparison.

My first studies focused on political philosophy. In 1948–1949, I worked for United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) with my teacher, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. The main task was to organize an international survey on the meaning of the term ‘democracy’ (McKeon & Rokkan, 1950). Because of this study, I became increasingly interested in the problems of political mass participation: how and in what rhythm have the different political systems been democratized, and how can one explain the variations and the contrasts between these processes? At this time, I

concentrated on a comparison of historical developments since the American and French revolutions, but for one reason or the other, I was caught by the machinery of research on contemporary matters. I went to the United States as an intern, learning statistical analysis and how to conduct surveys. All of a sudden, I was co-opted into a team that strove to organize an international survey: I was one of the first to thoroughly analyze a series of comparative sample-survey data: data on *teachers* in seven Western European countries (Rokkan, 1955).

This analysis forced me to deal with the theoretical problems of comparison. It was easy to colligate, column per column or table per table, the results obtained from the different countries. But could one explain the differences between the countries? It did not take long to realize that all differences could not be explained by variables at the *level of the survey*, that is, by variables at the *micro* level, characterizing individuals. It was necessary to introduce *macro* characteristics, variables that characterize the *context* of each teacher in our sample. We needed variables that denoted the *school system* that employed our teachers, the *local community* in which they resided, the *religious structure* of their country, the *party system* and the *regime type*. I constructed a number of typologies of these *macro* contexts, and this enabled me to account – more or less – for the variations that had been established by the statistical analysis. That was a start, but I was not content. The survey led me to raise a series of more difficult questions: Why were these contexts so different? How did they develop and how can one explain these differences in a model of general scope?

Such questions, already raised in political sociology, became increasingly urgent during the 1950s. My friends Marty Lipset and Juan Linz had assembled large stocks of survey data in order to compare the proportions of left/right votes in different social strata, particularly between different categories of workers. An unpublished collection of tables and analyses is still left from this extraordinary work. Carrying out these analyses, the researchers recognized the same *micro/macro*-problem as I myself had encountered when analyzing the teacher data. It is not too difficult to establish comparability between codings according to profession, industrial sector and economic position: here UN and International Labour Organization (ILO) statisticians and demographers have achieved fairly successful standardization. But how can one classify parties, unions, religious and linguistic groups, the institutional context of political behaviour? Marty Lipset and Juan Linz soon realized that it was not possible to explain differences in political behaviour of workers without analyzing the alternatives that party systems provide to workers in each country. Like me, Lipset and Linz reached the conclusion that it was necessary to switch from a microscopic analysis at the level of individuals to a macroscopic analysis at the level of structures and systems.

This conviction was reinforced by my own experience with comparative analysis at the level of the national electorate. In 1956, I launched a large Norwegian electoral research project. We were able to persuade the major American master of this discipline, Angus Campbell, to join us in this effort. With Henry Valen, we organized the first systematic survey of Norwegians' political behaviour. Campbell urged us to compare our results with results from the United States.

The first paper that resulted analyzed differences in rates of political participation. Campbell was convinced that we would find similar differences at occupational and educational levels in both countries: clearly lower participation among workers and people with a low level of education, higher participation on the part of the middle class and people with secondary or higher education. But the Norwegian data did not confirm this hypothesis: the participation index that we constructed showed no significant differences between working class and middle class nor between people with different educational levels. We verified this result in a number of multivariate analyses. Our simple and convincing conclusion was that the differences between the two countries at the individual level was a direct result of differences at the structural level, that is of the organizational alternatives that voters face in each of the systems (Campbell & Rokkan, 1960). In the United States, the two-party system only matched the structure of the sociocultural cleavages in a very indirect way. Thus, each party had a very heterogeneous population of voters, and the level of formal schooling was important for the recruitment of active participants in both parties. In Norway, in contrast, the five-party system corresponded in a much more direct way to the cleavage structure. Thus, these parties had much more homogeneous electorates, and even voters with no secondary or higher education were likely to participate and to be promoted within their parties.

Reflecting on the possibilities of generalizing this macro–micro analysis, I decided to develop a model of types of passages from the cleavage structure through the party system and on to distributions of behaviours at the individual level.

The questions I posed can be stated as follows: First, what were the most important cleavages in the history of democratization towards universal suffrage in the various Western European countries? Second, how and in what sequence were these cleavages politicized, in what way and in what combinations did they form the basis for the formation of a national, territorial system of partisan oppositions? Third, what were the immediate consequences of this structuration of the field of alternatives for the mass electorate?

I posed these three questions for each Western European country with competitive elections. But I was not content with just juxtaposing the results of these investigations. I tried to bring order into this wealth of information by developing a generative model that would explain in the most parsimonious way the variations that I observed. The first drafts for such a model dates from 1960 (Rokkan, 1962). The first elaborated version was published in the introduction to the collective volume that I edited with Marty Lipset exactly 10 years ago, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967).

Developing this model, I started from the fundamental concept of a *community of fate* (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*), which meant so much to Max Weber. I compiled a list of the sources of social, cultural or economic identity and established a typology of contrasts and conflicts between identity hierarchies. Based on this analysis, I developed a model with four basic cleavages: two of them predominantly cultural, two of them predominantly economic. On both sides of the basic diagram (Fig. 1.1), one of the cleavages tends towards the centre of the territorial system, the other towards the periphery:




Fig. 1.1. Basic Oppositions Scheme.

On the *cultural* side, the centre-based cleavage is the opposition between the secularizing state and the established church or popular sects, while the periphery-based cleavage is the opposition between nation and ethnic groups, dominant language standard and minority language.

On the *economic* side, the periphery-based cleavage is the opposition between urban networks and rural alliances, while the centre-based cleavage is the opposition between the propertied class and the working class.

But these four cleavages were not politicized to the same degree in all the countries. Not all of them were transformed to oppositions between parties. Why did one cleavage produce an opposition between well-established parties in one group of countries, but not in another group? Why was a cleavage manifested *within* parties in some countries, but *between* parties in other countries? This was my formulation of the dependent variable, the *explicandum* of the model. I searched for a rule, for an explanatory algorithm that would help me to understand the variations in the passage from a cleavage structure into a party system.

I found the answer in the history of the formation of alliances and oppositions within each territorial elite, within the elite that I call the builders of nation states. I established a typology of these alliance- and opposition-structures based on a simple combination of three variables: first, the result of the religious conflicts at the time of the *Reformation*; secondly, the degree of polarization between state and church in the aftermath of the *French revolution*; and third, the economic alliances between state bureaucracy and those who controlled agrarian and urban resources in the context of the *industrial revolution*. I reduced the space of variation to eight types, indicating for each type the dominant cleavages and the structure of the party system generated by these cleavages.

Time does not allow me to explain in detail the usage of this typology. I will cite only two examples.

Why was the urban/rural cleavage politicized in the Nordic countries, but not in England? In both cases, the Reformation integrated the church into the

structure of state elites. In the English case, however, this elite was based on a pronounced fusion of agrarian and urban interests. In Scandinavia, and particularly in Denmark and Norway, the state elite was based on an alliance with the urban bourgeoisie. The result was a clear difference between liberal mobilization in England and the corresponding mobilization in the Nordic countries. In Great Britain, the liberal party expressed an alliance between the Celtic periphery and ascending industrial and urban strata, in Scandinavia, the liberal parties mostly represented peasant alliances against the state establishment.

Another example: Why is there such a clear difference between the politicized centre/periphery-cleavage in Spain and the lack of a party that defends the periphery in Italy? In this case, the explanation can be found in the analysis of differences between territorial structure and urban networks: Spain has two important and economically strong peripheries, the Basque Country and Catalonia, while Italy, the state-building centre is also the predominant centre of the economy.

At the time, I was not very content with the eight-fold typology. In the 1967 chapter, I pointed to a series of difficulties, and a year later, I published a chapter containing a much more detailed differentiation (Rokkan, 1968).

But the essence of this attempt at systematic comparison had been established. I could turn to the facts of history. In order to understand variations observed across a number of present-day structures, I decided to proceed to an analysis of the major turning points in the establishment of alliances and accords that have constituted the political system. Studying the history of elections across European countries, I was increasingly impressed with the importance of the long run (*la longue durée*), the long-term repercussions of decisions taken and of alliances established over the course of each territorial history. Studying the history of parties, I was surprised to see how in most of the countries, the party systems had found an extraordinarily stable form in the course of the final extension of suffrage, in most cases during the 1920s, just after World War I. Studying the genealogy of the parties grouped within these very stable systems, I was struck by the regularities in the conditions for success of the parties' attempts at mobilization. The first successes of massive mobilization was based on territorial or cultural cleavages and only later was it possible for parties to mobilize solely on the basis of economic cleavages. I could grasp how these first waves of cultural mobilization took different forms in different nation states: mobilization from below through popular movements in the protestant countries, mobilization from above through the church hierarchy in the majority of Catholic countries. This is how I started to study variations in the style of mobilization as a function of characteristics and stages of national development.

I went further down this path by analyzing variations in the preconditions of partisan mobilization: *the extension of suffrage*. I asked why in some countries the right to vote was generalized all at once, without any transition, while other countries only slowly passed from one stage of democratization to another? This is the difference between France and England, between Prussia and Austria, between Denmark and Sweden. I tried to discover an explanatory logic behind these variations, and I think I found this logic in a typology of trajectories of

nation-building: for this purpose I had to combine a series of historical variables, starting with the Reformation, and on to the last stages of liberation of peripheral ethnicities. I presented the first sketch for such a typology in 1968, and in the book I published in 1970, *Citizens, Elections, Parties*. I tried, with no great success, to incorporate it into the model of passage from cleavages to parties (Rokkan, 1970).

This model in two stages was much less elegant than the first one, but it was surely more realistic. Indeed, many of the variables that I introduced in my effort to explain the process of democratization, should also be incorporated in the model of the transition from cleavage-structure to party system. I realized that the first model was too atomizing: it treated each case isolated, not taking the neighbouring context and the geopolitical position into account. I thus began to study the *spatial* links between different cases, and I am convinced that such inter-territorial relations are of decisive importance, both for the process of nation-building and for the later structuring of the politics of mass mobilization.

Rethinking these problems of spatial relations, I developed what I call a *conceptual map of Europe*: a topographical representation of a combination of some of the model's basic variables. The map has been published in several versions, one more complex than the other. A first version (Rokkan, 1975) was included in a collective volume I edited in 1973 with Shmuel Eisenstadt, *Building States and Nations* (Eisenstadt & Rokkan, 1973). Another version, more elaborated in certain respects, was published in the last of the volumes put out by the famous Committee on Comparative Politics, directed through more than 10 years by Gabriel Almond and Lucien Pye, entitled *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Yet another version was presented at a recent colloquium on the historical macrosociology of Europe. You have before you a French translation of this text, which needs further development.⁴

This conceptual map of Europe (Fig. 1.2) is a topographical representation of two typologies.⁵ I distinguish two abstract dimensions that correspond more or less directly to geographical coordinates. The west–east dimension consists of five types of combinations between geopolitical variables and an indicator of the weight of the urban networks in each territory. The north–south dimension represents four types of relations between state and culture in the wake of the upheavals of the Reformation. The most important feature of the map is the dorsal spine in the middle from north to south: this axial zone is marked by very strong urbanization that blocked the development of a dominant territorial centre before the French revolution, before Napoleon set his example.⁶

This conceptual map is only one of many possible combinations of the basic variables. You will understand my use of this model better by studying the scheme in Fig. 1.3. You find here an attempt to systematize the most essential elements of my model. By studying this scheme, you will understand how I got from a limited model of cleavages/parties to a family of models bearing on a full spectrum of variables pertaining to mass politics, the politics of mobilization that was structured as suffrage was universalized. You can see that I distinguish at least six variations to be explained, six *explicanda*: three of them characterize the *macroscopic* context of mass politics, three characterize alignments of *microscopic*

Strength of cities	Weaker	Stronger	Stronger	Weaker	Weaker
Strength of conquest centres	Weaker	Stronger	Weaker	Stronger	Weaker
Geopolitical type	Seaward peripheries	Seaward Empire-Nations	City-State Consociations	Landward Empire-Nations	Landward Peripheries
Beyond reach of Rome: Protestant	Iceland: Republic 10 th C. later under Norway, Denmark Scotland: Monarchy 12 th C. united with England 1707	Viking Empires: later reduced to ethnically homogeneous nation-states: Norway , later under Denmark Denmark →		← Sweden: State-building 16 th C., major empire, 17 th C. Turned seaward after 1660 through conquests in West	Finland: Province of Sweden 1809: Grand Dutchy of Russia
Territories once under Roman Empire and/or influenced by Roman Law: Protestant	Wales: subjected 16 th -17 th c.		Hanseatic League: Loose federation of cities around Baltic and North Seas, 13 th -16 th C.	Prussia: State-building 17 th C., empire 18 th C.; nucleus for unification of German Reich	
Religiously mixed	Ireland: Subjected 16 th -17 th C.		Netherlands: Northern provinces united in fight against Hapsburg: Independence 1648 Belgium: Only in 1830	Switzerland: Confederation 1291, major city-states added 14 th C.	Bohemia: Subjected by Hapsburg, 1620
Catholic	Brittany: Subjected 16 th C.	France: Consolidated 16 th C, empire building frustrated except in Indo-China, Africa	Aragon-Catalonia: United with Castile 1474; revolt 1640	Savoy-Piedmont: Independent nucleus for unification of city-state Italy	Bavaria Aristocratic Border Empires: Poland: divided 18 th C. Hungary: Overrun by 16 th C., with Habsburgs 1699
Counter-reformation territories		Crusading Empire built up in fight against Moslems; major overseas empires: Portugal, Spain			Crusading Empire built up on dynastic claims and wars against Ottomans: Austria

Fig. 1.2. A 'Conceptual map' of 16th–18th Century Western Europe.

Source: Rokkan (1971, p. 56). Compare Rokkan (1999, p. 142, Figure 13, and the editors' note 17, p. 349ff).

behaviour at the level of individuals facing these contexts. You notice that at both these levels, VI and VII, I distinguish three types of processes that must be investigated: first, extension of political rights, rights to participation and representation, as well as the use that various categories of the masses make of these