

# ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES

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and Edward J. Lawler

ADVANCES IN  
GROUP PROCESSES

**VOLUME 42**

# ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES

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ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES VOLUME 42

# ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES

EDITED BY

**SHANE R. THYE**

*University of South Carolina, USA*

AND

**EDWARD J. LAWLER**

*Cornell University, USA*



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INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

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# LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

<i>Saige M. Addison</i>	University of Iowa, USA
<i>Stephen Benard</i>	Indiana University, USA
<i>Aidan Combs</i>	The Ohio State University, USA
<i>Haley Crews</i>	Kent State University, USA
<i>Long Doan</i>	University of Maryland, USA
<i>Joshua Doyle</i>	Purdue University, USA
<i>Susan Jacobs</i>	Duke University, USA
<i>Anna C. Johansson</i>	Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, USA
<i>Peter Lista</i>	Indiana University, USA
<i>Marcus Mann</i>	Purdue University, USA
<i>Emily Meanwell</i>	Indiana University, USA
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<i>Eric L. Wright</i>	HCA Healthcare, USA

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## PREFACE

*Advances in Group Processes* is a peer-reviewed annual volume that publishes theoretical analyses, reviews, and theory based empirical chapters on group phenomena. The series adopts a broad conception of “group processes.” This includes work on groups ranging from the very small to the very large and on classic and contemporary topics such as status, power, trust, justice, conflict, social influence, heuristics, identity, decision-making, intergroup relations, and social networks. Previous contributors have included scholars from diverse fields including sociology, psychology, political science, economics, business, philosophy, computer science, mathematics, and organizational behavior.

Several years ago, we added an editorial board to the series to broaden the review process and draw upon the collective expertise of some of the top scholars in the discipline. That board consists of Jessica Collett, Joseph Dippong, Ashley Harrell, Karen Hegtvedt, Will Kalkhoff, Jeff Lucas, Joseph Quinn, and Jane Sell. This group of scholars has made the series better, and we are grateful for their service, guidance, and advice.

The volume opens with several papers that review various literatures connected to scholarship regarding race and gender. First, Cecilia L. Ridgeway reviews and synthesizes the literature regarding the intersectionality of gender and race in “Intersectional Gender and Race in Interaction and Inequality: An Updated Account for Group Processes.” She finds that the current evidence supports assertions regarding implicit prototypes with respect to both race and gender, and these have broad effects on the perceptions, judgments, and behaviors displayed to others. She also finds that framing issues are particularly important for understanding the impact of the intersection of race and gender. This paper represents a much-needed modern appraisal of the broad-based effects regarding race and gender as foundations of social inequality. Next, in a complementary article, Christabel L. Rogalin and Saige M. Addison provide a similar yet more focused review of intersectionality research in “The State of Intersectionality in Experimental Masculinity Threat Literature: A 30-Year Systematic Review.” These authors examine how frequently sexuality, race/ethnicity, and intersectionality are studied within the masculine-threat domain. Using data from 1985 to 2023 across 4 distinct data banks, they explore a total of 151 different studies that analyze and seriously consider these topics. While they find that a majority of these articles reference such topics, the number that actually analyze race, ethnicity, and sexuality are far fewer in number. Further, they find that intersectionality is rarely referenced in this sample of scholarly work. Rounding out this section, Anna C. Johansson and Jane Sell review the central concepts, assumptions, and theoretical mechanisms that motivate diversity,

equity, and inclusion (DEI) training in “From Bias to Behavior: Understanding the Theoretical Gaps in Diversity Training.” They find that such programs rely heavily on cognitive level interventions to raise awareness and modify implicit and explicit attitudes toward race. They additionally illustrate several shortcomings and gaps within these approaches, and importantly, offer solutions grounded in structural social psychology that may aid administrators in measuring and modifying behavioral inequalities. One strength of this approach is its reliance on current social psychological theory to better understand the problems inherent to modern (somewhat atheoretical) DEI training programs. Together, these three papers provide a current and much-needed assessment of scholarship and practices related to gender and race in the social sciences.

The following two papers examine how political party affiliations color the perceptions and attributions of party constituents. Susan Jacobs and Aidan Combs examine political differences in the fundamental sentiments of Republicans and Democrats in ““They Saw an Arrest”: Situation Definition, Polarization, and Affect Control Theory.” In this study, subjects are shown a video of a police officer interacting with either a child or an immigrant and asked to rate the affective meanings attached to these stimuli. The authors find important differences in ratings of affective meanings that cross political lines. This research broadens the empirical base of affect control theory by considering how affective meanings and transient impressions form in the context of political affiliations. Next, Joshua Doyle and Marcus Mann assess whether or not political partisanship will impact how individuals perceive how the general public trusts the institutions that they themselves trust. In “The Role of (Mis)Perceptions of Others’ Institutional Trust in Partisan Group Identity Formation,” the authors deploy survey methodology to collect data on the trust in US institutions and the level of trust perceived by the general public. These are then compared to comparable measures from the 2021 General Social Survey. The findings suggest that Democrats have greater trust in knowledge institutions, while Republicans have greater trust in traditional institutions. Both groups perceive the general public as less trusting overall. This paper should be of widespread interest to scholars interested in political polarization, group identity effects, and perceived levels of trust.

The final three papers detail the importance of group dynamics on hazing interventions, attitudes, and viewpoints regarding abortion and the emotional responses to acts of revenge and forgiveness. First, Haley Crews adopts a new methodological approach to investigate when college students decide to intervene in hazing encounters and other abusive behaviors in “Happy Hazing? How Fraternity Involvement Influences Hazing Intervention Behaviors in College Students.” This paper uses a novel image-based task to determine whether fraternity membership impacts the tendency to intervene in hazing encounters using an online survey. The project also measures perceived empathy and expectations of hazing among participants. Crews finds that fraternity group members have lower levels of empathy relative to nonfraternity members, but ironically, they are more likely to directly intervene in hazing encounters. Overall, this project has implications for the efficacy of education and heightened awareness regarding

hazing rituals on college campuses. Next, Catherine J. Taylor examines how beliefs and expectations regarding motherhood impact views on abortion in “Ideas about Gender and Motherhood are Related to Support for Legal Abortion.” Specifically, Taylor examines whether or not two related gender ideologies – *gender essentialism* and *exclusive motherhood* – are predictive of views pertaining to the endorsement of legalized abortion. Using data from two national probability surveys, she finds that both ideologies are generally connected to abortion attitudes. This paper is the first of its kind to assess whether or not exclusive motherhood is related to beliefs about abortion and provides a deeper glimpse into the kinds of gender ideologies that undergird abortion laws in the United States. Finally, Stephen Benard and colleagues use data from a survey experiment to gauge emotional reactions to acts of forgiveness and revenge in “Emotional Responses to Intergroup Revenge and Forgiveness.” Respondents to the survey were specifically asked to record their emotions regarding a written account of either intergroup forgiveness or revenge. The findings indicate that respondents report higher levels of happiness, pride, and other positive emotions when ingroup members are forgiving rather than vengeful. The study is viewed and interpreted in terms of Kemper’s theory of emotion and the potential shifting of relative ingroup status. Overall, the study has implications for reducing intergroup conflict in a variety of settings.

Together, the papers in this volume make important strides to deepen our understanding of group processes and dynamics in groups both large and small.

Shane R. Thye and Edward J. Lawler  
Volume Co-Editors

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# INTERSECTIONAL GENDER AND RACE IN INTERACTION AND INEQUALITY: AN UPDATED ACCOUNT FOR GROUP PROCESSES

Cecilia L. Ridgeway

*Stanford University, USA*

## ABSTRACT

*Purpose: The goal of this chapter is to provide an updated account for group processes researchers of race and gender intersectional effects in social relations and their consequences for people of differing race and gender identities.*

*Methodology/Approach: The author takes Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's initial theoretical framework for race and gender intersectional processes in social relations as a starting point. The author reviews and critically assesses subsequent empirical evidence and theoretical developments relevant to its arguments in order to create an updated account.*

*Findings: Current evidence strengthens support for key arguments about implicit prototypes within stereotypes that are both raced and gendered, that are defined in relation to a male and white standard, and that have socio-cognitive effects on perceptions, judgments, and behaviors toward others. Current evidence and theorizing about the effects of prototypes on judgments and outcomes in social relations suggest further distinguishing the discriminatory effects of hypo- and hyper-prototypicality, compared to prototypicality rather than just prototypicality versus nonprototypicality. Recent research also strengthens evidence for the framing importance of context for intersectional effects and raises new issues. These include whether backlash against gender status violations is strongest within race, the intersectional effects of sexuality, the extensive power of gender as an intersectional dimension, and the problem of complex, intersectional stereotypes of class, race, and gender.*

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Social and Theoretical Implications: *While intersectional effects vary by context, they are ubiquitous and must be taken into account to understand how race and gender shape relational inequality.*

**Keywords:** Intersectionality; interactional inequality; race; gender; stereotypes; prototypes

## INTRODUCTION

It is a core tenant of group processes research that everyday social relational contexts act as powerful arenas for the production and maintenance of inequality among individuals and groups. This is especially the case for inequality based on recognized social differences such as gender, race, and class (cf., [Ridgeway, 2019](#)). In an increasingly diverse society, it is incumbent on group processes researchers to develop better understandings of how social differences that act as major axes of inequality in the United States *jointly* shape relational inequality when mutually, even if implicitly, salient in a situation. Doing so requires taking into account that the joint effects of some such social differences, notably gender and race, are *intersectional* in nature, not merely additive. Social differences have intersectional effects when the cultural meanings associated with them implicitly overlap, such that the meanings evoked by a person's identity on one difference, say race, are shaped not only general racial beliefs but also by the meanings associated with their identity on another difference such as gender ([Chavez & Wingfield, 2018](#); [Collins & Bilge, 2020](#); [Hall et al., 2019](#); [McCall, 2005](#); [Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013](#)).

People are never just one social identity and not also other social identities at same time, and this complexity of identity is especially likely be apparent to individuals in social relational contexts. A context is social relational if individuals must define others in relation to self in order to comprehend the situation and act. Thus, social relational contexts include the social interactions at the heart of group processes research, as well as consequential imaginative interactions such as reading and evaluating another's resume in a hiring context.

In such situations, evidence suggests that people automatically categorize others by gender and, in the United States, by race as well, or at least try to ([Ito & Urland, 2003](#); [Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010](#)). They may recategorize the other's gender or race based on subsequent information but, even in a world of diversifying gender and race identities, they do *not* try to categorize them (cf., [Ridgeway & Saperstein, 2024](#)). This automatic categorization appears to reflect the fact that in US culture, gender and race are primary frames for defining "who" the other is in order to make sense of them ([Brewer & Lui, 1989](#); [Ridgeway, 2011](#)). Categorization, in turn, cognitively primes widely held cultural beliefs about gender and race, that is, stereotypes, and makes them available to shape people's judgments and actions toward one another. The impact of these cultural beliefs on evaluations and behavior depends on the extent to which the context makes them salient for the participants and relevant to actions at hand. But for now, the point is that if race and gender have intersectional effects in the

United States, then these effects are likely to be especially consequential for participants' outcomes in interactional and other social relational contexts.

My goal in this paper is to provide an updated account for group processes researchers of race and gender intersectional effects in relational contexts and their consequences for inequality of outcomes among people of differing race and gender identities. To do so, I take [Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's \(2013\)](#) initial theoretical framework for these intersectional processes as a starting point. I then review and critically assess subsequent empirical evidence and theoretical developments relevant to its arguments. The theoretical account Tamar Kricheli-Katz and I sketched out a decade ago proposes a number of arguments about how cultural beliefs about race and gender might implicitly overlap and produce distinctive cultural binds, but sometimes also freedoms, for Black, White, and Asian men and women in relational contexts ([Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013](#)). This account was bolstered by empirical findings emerging in social psychology at about the same time suggesting that races were gendered in both cultural beliefs and socio-cognitive perceptions ([Galinsky et al., 2013](#); [Goff et al., 2008](#); [Johnson et al., 2012](#)). As an initial account, however, many theoretical as well as empirical questions were left open in the analysis. At this point, the account is ripe for further assessment and development.

The [Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz \(2013\)](#) framework is formulated to be consistent with other group processes theories such as status characteristics theory and Ridgeway's framing analysis of gender ([Fisk & Ridgeway, 2018](#); [Ridgeway, 2011](#)). For this reason, I use it rather than other recent models of intersectional effects (e.g., [Collins & Bilge, 2020](#); [Hall et al., 2019](#); [Wong & McCullough, 2021](#)) as my focus for developing an updated account for group processes research. In particular, the [Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz \(2013\)](#) framework takes explicit account of the evidence that widely held stereotypes of both race and gender contain status beliefs that associate people in one gender group (men) and one racial group (Whites) with greater overall competence and worthiness of respect than those in a contrasting gender (women) or racial group (various non-White groups), an assumption that is central to much group processes research on gender, race, and inequality. In further developing [Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's \(2013\)](#) framework, I discuss it in relation to other recent models of race and gender intersectional effects.

In updating Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's analytic framework, I focus primarily on the intersection of race and gender even though the original account also considers class. I will, however, discuss class as new evidence warrants. I will also discuss the limited but intriguing evidence of how sexuality intersects race and gender in its social relational effects. Finally, although I recognize the limits in doing so, I will focus my discussion of race on Blacks, Whites, and Asians because these have been the racial groups addressed in the empirical literature. Notably, this leaves out Latine people (who are not otherwise categorized as White or Black) which is a serious remaining gap in our knowledge ([Chavez & Wingfield, 2018](#)).

In what follows, I begin by describing the conceptual framework behind Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's account of intersectional processes in social relations. This account centers on implicit prototypes embedded in cultural

stereotypes of gender and races that cause the meanings of the stereotypes to overlap. I then turn to a review of the current empirical evidence in regard to key arguments from the account. Specifically, I review evidence for the gendering of racial stereotypes and for implicit prototypes within stereotypes. Next, I review current evidence for the effects of prototypes on judgments and outcomes in social relations, a review that suggests theoretical refinements of the Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz account based on the concepts of hypo- and hyper-prototypicality (Wong & McCullough, 2021). Finally, I turn to a series of newer arguments raised by recent research. These are centered on the framing importance of context, the intersectional effects of sexuality, the power of gender as an intersectional dimension, and the problem of complex intersectional stereotypes of class, race, and gender.

## **PROTOTYPES AND THE IMPLICIT OVERLAP OF GENDER AND RACE STEREOTYPES**

If social differences produce intersectional effects in social relations when the cultural meanings associated with them implicitly overlap, the first task of a theoretical account is to conceptualize this overlap. Collins and Bilge (2020) view intersectionality as a result of intersecting power relations acting at multiple levels, including structural, cultural, and interactional processes to produce effects that are always relational and context specific. While largely consistent overall with most group processes perspectives on gender, race, and social relations, Collins and Bilge (2020) do not unpack the specific cultural and social psychological processes involved. Theories that do try to unpack these processes, including Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013), point to widely held cultural stereotypes about women, men, Black, White, and Asian groups as the location of overlapping meanings that trigger intersectional effects in social relations (Galinsky et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2019; Wong & McCullough, 2021). These stereotypes, in turn, reflect and are supported by observed patterns of power and status relations among people of differing gender and racial identities (Hall et al., 2019; Ridgeway, 2011, 2019). In Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's (2013) account, while stereotypes are the location of widely shared overlapping meanings of race and gender, this overlap comes about, consistent with Collins and Bilge (2020), through intersecting power relations among men and women of different races.

Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) point out that the widely held stereotypes of gender and race in the United States that everyone knows, if not endorses, are *hegemonic* beliefs. That is, they are not just held by individuals. They are also institutionalized in the media, legal presumptions, organizational structures, and the arrangement of public spaces (Acker, 2006; Ridgeway, 2011). An implication is that the version of gender and race beliefs that become institutionalized reflect the experiences of these differences by dominant groups who have the most power to shape institutional arrangements. Because they are institutionalized, these beliefs become shared as cultural knowledge by subdominants as well. This gives

these institutionalized gender and race beliefs the power to coordinate behavior in public contexts, even when many may not personally endorse them (Ridgeway, 2011, 2019).

If differences are usually understood as contrasts with a dominant standard, then, in hegemonic beliefs, Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013, pp. 302–303) argue, gender and race should be perceived in terms of contrasts with the most dominant group, White (middle or upper class) men. If gender is a contrast with White men, then the *prototype* of “women” that is embedded in hegemonic gender beliefs is implicitly a White woman, just as “men” are White men. And if gender is marked as a contrast of the feminine against the male (masculine) standard, stereotypic femininity should be linked most prescriptively with White women, by this account. In this way, the prototypes of men and women are implicitly raced.

A prototype is an individual or subgroup (e.g., White women) who is perceived as having the attributes most strongly associated with the superordinate group (women) (Turner et al., 1987). Research has shown that people who are perceived as more prototypical of a group are treated more strongly in terms of the stereotype of that group (Macrae & Quadflieg, 2010). Thus, the race or gender prototypicality of an individual is another factor, along with salience and relevance to the goals of the context that affects how strongly race and gender stereotypes shape expectations, evaluations, and behavior in social relations.

Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) further argue, following similar logic, that if gender is culturally perceived as one type of contrast with the most dominant group, White men, then race should be perceived as different sort of contrast with White men. The argument is that while cultural meanings of race and gender may implicitly overlap, race and gender are widely understood as distinct forms of human difference and this cultural presumption has the consequence of keeping overlapping meanings in stereotypes of “gender” and “race” implicit rather than explicit.

If race is a different dimension of contrast with White men than gender, it implicitly becomes a contrast among different groups of men, hierarchically defined in terms of hegemonic masculinity versus various subordinated masculinities (Connell, 1995; Messner, 1995; Ridgeway & Kricheli-Katz, 2013, p. 302). These subordinated masculinities are contrasted as either too masculine (e.g., aggressively powerful, threatening) or not masculine enough (e.g., effeminate) against the hegemonic White male standard of “just right” masculinity. In this way, the prototype of different racial groups, such as Whites, Blacks, and Asians, is implicitly a man of that group with associated masculinity–femininity. This embeds gendered meanings in racial stereotypes, causing them to interact. Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) made these arguments based on then emerging evidence of stereotypic associations between Blacks and hyper-masculinity and between Asians and relative femininity, compared to Whites (Goff et al., 2008; Galinsky et al., 2013; Wilikins et al., 2011). These associations were presumed to reflect the historical conditions in the United States of earlier White-Black and White-Asian social relations.

By Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's account (2013), then, it is the implicit prototypes that are embedded in both gender and race stereotypes that cause intersectional effects in social relations. Subsequent accounts of the intersectional effects of gender and race stereotypes have similarly honed-in on prototypes as central to understanding these effects (Hall et al., 2019; Wong & McCullough, 2021). Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) argue that White men approximate the prototype of both "Whites" and "men." White women are prototypical of "women." Black men are prototypical of "Blacks," which is not inconsistent with also being men. Asian men, however, while they are prototypical of "Asians," do not match the prototype of men which can create intersectional binds or barriers for them, especially in masculine-typed contexts like those connected with leadership (Wong & McCullough, 2021). Because the prototypes of women and Asians overlap in consistent ways, Asian women fit reasonably within both.

As many have observed, however, it is Black women who do not match the prototypes of either women or Blacks (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989; hooks, 1989). Such nonprototypicality can create *intersectional invisibility* which means that it is literally harder to be seen and noticed in social contexts (Collins, 1990; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Sesko & Biernat, 2010). This is most often disadvantaging although, because nonprototypicality moderates the impact of stereotypes, it can sometimes also allow nonprototypical people like Black women to escape the most disadvantaging aspects of both race and gender prescriptions (Chavez & Wingfield, 2018; Hall et al., 2019; Livingston et al., 2012; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Rosette et al., 2018).

Chavez and Wingfield (2018) reviewed Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's theoretical framework in the context of understanding how gender interactions are racialized. They concluded that the central argument about stereotype prototypicality held promise for understanding intersectional effects in interaction but that the theory needed further development. They also reviewed additional empirical evidence consistent with the argument but noted that much more evidence is needed.

It is clear that the further development of Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's (2013) theoretical framework for understanding race and gender intersectional effects involves a set of interrelated conceptual and empirical issues. To begin with, we need to know the current state evidence that racial stereotypes are indeed gendered in the manner that the framework predicts, as indicated by associations with masculinity–femininity. Second, and relatedly, what is the evidence that some types of people are seen as more prototypical of their gender or race than others? Within this broader question is the further question of evidence that there is a male standard in prototypes against which both gender and race are defined. There is also the question of whether Asian men or women are more prototypical of their racial group, given the associations of Asians with femininity. The situation of Asian women is somewhat ambiguous in Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's account. Third, we need to clarify the link between overlapping meanings in stereotypes and their socio-cognitive effects on the perceptions and judgments of others. After addressing these empirical and conceptual stereotype and socio-cognition issues, we will turn to evidence of the effects of stereotypical prototypicality on judgments and behavior in social relations.

## EVIDENCE FOR THE GENDERING OF RACIAL STEREOTYPES

Two sets of studies provide the clearest evidence that the stereotypes of Whites, Asians, and Blacks are indeed gendered in that they are associated with greater or lesser degrees of masculinity and femininity. In the first of these, [Galinsky et al. \(2013\)](#) first asked a sample of participants to rate a list of 99 standard stereotype attributes on a scale from extremely masculine to extremely feminine and computed a relative masculinity score for each attribute. They then presented these same attributes to a separate sample of participants and asked them to choose 10 attributes to assign to each of three racial groups, Asians, Blacks, and Whites. Results showed that the average masculinity of the traits assigned to Blacks was significantly higher than that of traits assigned to Whites which in turn were significantly more masculine than the traits assigned to Asians. A second study showed these masculinity–femininity associations at the implicit level as well. Participants primed with “Black” responded significantly faster to masculine words than those primed with White or Asian. In contrast, participants primed with Asian responded significantly more rapidly to feminine words than those primed with White or Black.

[Hall et al. \(2015\)](#) replicated and extended these findings. This time the initial sample ranked the 99 attributes on degree of both masculinity and femininity, yielding a relative masculinity and femininity score for each attribute. A second sample was again presented with the 99 attributes and asked to choose 10 that were most typical of one of 6 groups, Asian men, Asian women, White men, White women, and Black men, and Black women. Subtracting the average masculinity from the average femininity of the assigned attributes, they found that Asians overall were perceived to be significantly feminine typed, Whites overall were not significantly gender typed (i.e., were the neutral standard), and Blacks overall were significantly masculine typed. Looking at gender within race, Asian women were seen as highly feminine, followed by White women who were also significantly feminine. Black women and Asian men, two nonprototypical groups, were not significantly gender typed. White men, in contrast, were viewed as significantly masculine and Black men were seen as even more highly masculine.

Taken together, these sets of studies clearly show that the content of racial stereotypes is gendered, in that they carry significant associations of relative degrees of masculinity and femininity centered on a White standard. The pattern of these associations is consistent with [Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz’s \(2013\)](#) arguments which is not surprising since these arguments developed in dialog with the then emerging [Galinsky et al. \(2013\)](#) study. It is noteworthy, however, that subsequent evidence has continued to confirm this pattern of associations between race and masculinity–femininity ([Hall et al., 2015](#); [Lei et al., 2020](#); [Schug et al., 2015](#)). These associations are now widely acknowledged in reviews of the intersectionality literature (e.g., [Hall et al., 2019](#); [Rosette et al., 2018](#); [Wong & McCullough, 2021](#)).

Overlapping meanings in race and gender stereotypes produce intersectional effects in social relations but they do so primarily by creating implicit socio-cognitive links between gender and race that affect perceptions and judgments of others. Stereotypes, as widely shared and taken for granted beliefs at the cultural level, work together with the socio-cognitive links they produce at the individual level (see [Hall et al., 2019](#) for a detailed account) to shape intersectional effects at the social relational level. We next turn to evidence that the very process of recognizing a person as a man or woman is shaped by the masculinity–femininity of racial stereotypes. These studies also lead us to more direct evidence of prototypes embedded in stereotypes and to evidence of a male and White standard in person perception ([Merritt & Harrison, 2006](#)).

### **EVIDENCE FOR PROTOTYPES: THE SOCIO-COGNITIVE EFFECTS OF OVERLAPPING STEREOTYPES**

If someone is perceived as more prototypical of a social group like men or women, it should be easier and faster to categorize them as a member of that group. This is the premise of studies on how the implicit gendering of racial groups biases the categorization of faces as men or women. In a provocative early study of this sort, [Goff et al. \(2008\)](#) found that the faces of Black men and women were perceived as more masculine than White faces and that Black women’s faces were more likely to be mistaken as male than White women’s, even though gender categorization errors were low overall.

[Johnson et al. \(2012\)](#) followed up on earlier research with a carefully designed set of studies on the speed and accuracy with which Black, Asian, and White faces were categorized as males or females by study participants. Reflecting the male standard, they found, as did [Goff et al. \(2008\)](#), that men’s faces overall were more rapidly categorized than women’s. This is a consistent finding in subsequent work as well ([Lei et al., 2020](#); [Schug et al., 2015](#)). They also found, as expected from overlapping stereotypes, that participants found Black faces easier to classify as male and harder to classify as female compared to White faces. Asian faces, in contrast, were easier to categorize as female and harder to categorize as male. [Thomas et al. \(2014\)](#) similarly found that Black women were more likely to be miscategorized as men than White women and were more slowly categorized as Black than Black men. As this shows, participants had the most trouble processing the faces of Black women, in particular, but also Asian men, giving clear evidence of their nonprototypicality as men and women. If their faces are harder to process, then this can be a clear source of intersectional invisibility in social relations ([Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008](#)).

Research by [Lei et al. \(2020\)](#) suggests that the intersectional prototypes evidenced by [Johnson et al. \(2012\)](#) go deep in US culture in that people develop them as children. In [Lei et al.’s \(2020\)](#) first study, both a sample of children, aged 3-8, and a sample of adults rapidly gender categorized faces of men and women who were Asian, Black, and White. Results showed that the male standard develops early, in that the children, like the adults, categorized men’s faces faster