MIKE O'DONNELL

CRISES AND POPULAR DISSENT

THE DIVIDED WEST

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Crises and Popular Dissent: The Divided West

BY

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INVESTOR IN PEOPLE

To the people and the planet – one world

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Preface

This book analyses the crisis-ridden period of the first 20 years of this century. It discusses the internal divisions and external challenges of liberalism and argues the case for a revival of progressive politics and policies in the United States and Europe, particularly Britain. These have been hard years of international conflict, recession, polarised politics and the blight of Covid-19. We may or may not be past 'peak populism' but what has emerged from it in many parts of the world is a hegemony of the political right and much uncertainty on the left. Yet, this may change, partly due to 'the wake up' call of populism and the rethinking it has provoked.

Populism itself, specifically left populism, but more particularly the related but distinct tradition of progressivism offer ideas and policies that could revive radical reform including in relation to the environment, climate change and human and planetary well-being. The legacy of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s is still strong if severely contested, and must be defended and built on, as must the ideas and vision of younger activists. 'Old left' ideology, though still relevant, is not enough; a new left must find renewed energy and direction. Otherwise there is a risk of an era of deepening illiberalism, inequality and further ecological degradation. Three related themes are developed throughout the book: liberalism – hegemony and crisis; the populist challenge to liberalism; and constructing a progressive future whilst combating reactionary nationalism? The relationships between these themes is central to understanding the key political and social developments of a conflict-ridden and anxious period and of finding a way out of it.

Chapter 1 introduces the core themes of the book as described above and defines key supporting concepts, concluding with my own perspective and a vote of confidence in the potential of activist youth as a main carrier of progressive change. Chapter 2 provides an overview of populism, vital because the outbreak of populist sentiment and movements substantially contributed to the events and developments that have so far set the political and cultural agenda of the new millennium, disrupting post–Cold War liberal hegemony. Two contrasting views of populism are compared: Cas Mudde's sharply critical account of populism and Chantal Mouffe's support for left and opposition to right populism. In the latter part of the chapter, I develop my perspective that 'cultural populism' is 'semi-autonomous' from political populism. Chapter 3 critically examines the core values of liberalism, commenting on its weaknesses and enduring qualities with reference to its historical development. The roots of liberal society lie in the

European Enlightenment emerging in the early seventeenth century and gaining momentum in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of industrial and socio-political revolution. Yet, contradictions within liberalism have contributed to its difficulties, including a tendency of liberal politicians to embroil their countries in overseas wars and latterly lacking either the will or imagination to innovate radically in ideas and policy. As I write the American Capitol building in Washington has been invaded by supporters of President Trump. Those who believe in democracy would be wise not to take it for granted nor to assume that it is beyond improvement.

Chapter 4 analyses why Britain voted for Brexit in 2016 and America for Trump. The underlying trends explaining these dramatic and, for many, unexpected events go back several decades: neoliberalism, globalisation and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment intertwined with right-wing populism. In the first 20 years of the millennium, a flood of books, mainly written by liberals, warned of serious threats to but also of flaws within liberal democracy. Deep divisions between neoliberals and progressive liberals are discussed, as are perhaps equally damaging disagreements among progressive liberals that weakened opposition to Brexit and Trump. The equality agenda is basic and necessary, but it must accommodate the changes brought about by the social movements that seek a wide margin of identity and lifestyle freedom, bread, certainly, but also roses.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the above themes in relation to, respectively, the United States, Europe and Britain. These chapters are the geo-political 'spine' of the book. Liberalism is further discussed in terms of two related ideologies or narratives, progressive liberalism and neoliberalism. The latter is seen as a Trojan horse within liberalism, an ideology of extreme competition and capital accumulation in tension with the more humanist and socially interventionist tradition of progressive liberalism, including the regulation (but not destruction) of markets. These two ideologies by no means cover the whole of liberalism which as a way of thinking and acting penetrated almost every aspect of Western culture and gradually much of the rest of the world. Indeed, the process of global modernisation is, for better and worse, largely a liberal one although it has provoked a variety of reactions around the world, many defining their own ideologies and identities, liberal or otherwise. Conservatism, in the sense of support for traditional values and institutions that does not always sit comfortably with its modern identification with capitalism, and socialism's foundation in collective values and a strong state, continue to challenge liberal hegemony both in the West and elsewhere. However, both these ideologies now largely embrace the freedoms won mainly by the social movements mentioned above, sometimes referred to as social liberalism although this term does not convey the tough political struggles involved in achieving them. An important aspect of the sections on liberalism is an analysis of social democracy as an ideology and political practice that combines elements of progressive liberalism and socialism; both traditions can claim a sustained commitment to democratic and social progress that could provide a renewed basis for collaboration. However, whilst belief in human rights extends beyond liberalism, including many socialists and some conservatively minded people, it is particularly embedded within the liberal tradition.

Chapters 7 and 8 are closely integrated and build a case for a new phase of reform in British democracy. Chapter 7 briefly reviews the history and more fully the current state of populism in Britain and how it might affect the perspectives and policies of Britain's main political parties. It also presents my differences as well as common ground with Chantal Mouffe's analysis of left populism and my preference for the term progressivism as the descriptor of a proposed movement for radical democracy and social equality. Chapter 7 also more widely reviews British politics post-Brexit and looks at possible directions of development. Chapter 8, drawing mainly on examples from Britain, argues for a revival of progressivism through an infusion of radical democratic policy which would introduce participatory democracy into the country's main institutional systems. A major move to radical reform requires that progressive liberals, left populists and social democrats build on their shared beliefs, make common progressive cause and, equally importantly, integrate many of the ideas of younger activists, including Extinction Rebellion (XR) and Black Lives Matter (BLM). The label given to this collaborative approach to values, organisation and policy, matters less than that it does in fact happen and that its practical implications for liberty and equality are clearly spelled out. The name 'Progressive Alliance' or one similar could be adopted to draw together and signal to the public the direction of its reforming intent. Without such a robust initiative, the turn to the authoritarian right in parts of Europe and internationally, even if it is now faltering slightly, may yet mould society in its own hierarchical and controlling image. In the United States, the defeat of Donald Trump in the 2020 election is no guarantee of a period of dynamic progressive reform but the prospect of Joe Biden's presidency is incomparably better than the alternative. The desire for a more genuinely democratic, fairer and safer world has not been quenched, the countermovement to reactionary times may come soon enough…

In most of Europe, the prospects for reform appear less immediately promising than in the United States (see p. 106). However, in Britain a possible scenario for the construction of a progressive majority was suggested by the shock Liberal-Democratic by-election victory of June 17, 2021, in Chesham and Amersham that turned a Conservative majority of over 16,000 into a Liberal-Democratic one of over 8,000 in a 25% swing. The Labour vote, down from 12.9 to 1.6 percent, had substantially shifted in a tactical move to the Liberal Democrats as preferable to the Conservatives. Previously, tactical voting had variously assisted Labour, Liberal-Democratic and Green Party candidates into power in elections at different geo-political levels – national, regional and local. But the scale of this result in a solidly middle-class, long-time Conservative constituency highlights the vulnerability of other 'blue wall' Conservative constituencies in the home counties and the South-East, many with much smaller majorities. However, one 'brick' out of the wall is no guarantee that many more will follow. But it does suggest that a strategy of co-operation – whether formal or informal, through alliance or tactical voting – might be the most reliable route to power for left of centre parties, none of which currently look likely to win if they continue to split the progressive vote. Such a development would intensify the trend to party re-alignment discussed in several chapters, with 'bricks' or parties of different colours dislodging and

replacing each other in a new if somewhat fluid formation. An accumulation of data on voting behaviour by age, education and class, the former two not crudely reducible to the third, supports that a reshaping of the electoral landscape with a partial rejigging of Tory blue and red, green and orange is an immanent possibility. A recast progressivism could emerge from these developments rooted in an integration of local activism and a vision of renewal at the national level of the kind indicated in chapters 7 and 8. The techno-social revolution underlying potential political realignment is discussed in chapter 2 (pp. 32–42).

Chapter 9 considers socio-political issues relating to environmental damage, climate change and human and planetary health and well-being. These are the most crucial issues discussed in the book – in a period when several other matters of major import have occurred. Covid-19 and its social effects are analysed in the wider context of humans relationship to nature. Looking ahead, more pre-planned resource mobilisation to achieve collective goals, including to reduce poverty and improve the general standard of health and planetary well-being, should figure prominently in any progressive project. The cost of being prepared could pay for itself by reducing the severity of the next crisis as well as strengthening a sense of fairness and community. Substantial international cooperation is necessary in preparing for pan-global threats, given that the existential challenges facing humanity do not observe national boundaries. We, as a species, must do better and must do differently. Chapter 10, the Conclusion, includes my reflections on matters raised throughout the book, and invites readers to consider and form their own conclusions – always, of course, subject to change.

Organisationally, the book moves through three introductory conceptual and theoretical chapters, a spine of four geo-political chapters, and the remaining three focus, respectively, on participatory democracy; Covid-19, the environment and climate change; and reviewing interactively the issues raised in the book. References are at the back of the book. Internet and some lengthy newspaper references are given there to avoid cluttering the text. In-text the key to references is the name of the relevant author(s) or institution.

I would like to thank a trio of individuals who have supported me, differently but outstandingly, in this project. The in-house back-up came mainly from Helen Beddow whose subject knowledge was helpful beyond any expectation and whose technical expertise was equally appreciated. I'm also glad to thank several other members of the Emerald team who were extremely helpful. My partner Dorrie Chetty was 'there' to provide practical and emotional support when she was busy enough herself. I cannot thank her enough, but I will try! My 'old mate' Jim Pey provided stimulating critique and discussion as well as some very useful material. A good friend. Beyond this 'trinity', family and friends have watched me wrestling with the tough and taxing issues of the early twenty-first century, variously with tolerance and bemusement. Writing takes 'time out of time' which is 'a big ask'. So, I hope they find the results of my work readable and interesting and, occasionally, amusing – a sentiment I extend to others who engage with it.

Chapter 1

The Crisis of Liberal Hegemony and the Populist Challenge: Terms and Context

Introduction: The Argument of the Book

During the first 20 years of the new millennium the liberal democracies of the developed world, especially the United States, the world's dominant power, experienced a rising challenge from populism, mainly nationalistic right populism but also from left populism. This book provides an explanatory account of why and how this happened in the United States, Britain and Europe. Right populism is part of a wider, although not unbroken nor uncontested, gradual shift to the right in these regions that began in the 1970s, partly as a response to immigration. This broader trend to the right is also addressed here. In extensively reviewing the crises and conflicts of recent years in these regions, I make the argument for what is termed radical democracy rooted in civic participation, some reform of national democratic institutions and a healing 'one world' cosmopolitan vision backed by practical humanitarian policies. After the troubled opening years of the twenty first century followed by the blight of Covid-19, the aspiration is for 'a better normal'.

Although expressive of real needs and genuine sentiments, right populism shows a marked tendency to authoritarianism. However, it may be that the defeat of Donald Trump in the American presidential election of 2020 will presage a more widespread turn away from right populism to less strident democratic communication. Trump lost to the mildly progressive Democratic Party candidate, Joe Biden, but for many it may be that Biden was not Donald Trump was enough reason to vote for him. The turn-out for the election was, by some margin, a record. Left populism has its own issues with authoritarian leaders, but it is more positively characterised by elements of radical democracy which advocates greater democratic participation and decentralisation. The term radical comes from the Latin meaning 'root' and it is especially grassroots power that radical democracy seeks to exercise and enhance. For now, radical democracy is less a self-conscious movement and more an idea that is being turned into a reality in many local communities. The surge of mutual self-help that quickly emerged during Covid-19 demonstrates its latent potential. If it becomes more widespread and is matched by funding and decentralising policies at the national level, radical democracy could help to inspire a new phase in democracy. Democracy in the West has evolved slowly since the early modern period, through struggle and

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often in the face of determined opposition. The purpose of radical democracy is to further democratise not only the political system but also the main institutional sectors of society by the empowerment of those they are supposed to serve. This is ambitious, but this book will illustrate an active and widespread base of support for such a policy direction. The argument made here is better described as progressive than left populist, although clearly it is closer to the latter than to right populism.

The movement for the radical democratisation of power is, in the early 2020s, well underway at the local and community level – as is described in several sections of this book. It is logical that the struggle for grassroots power should not wait for the government to bestow it but is driven by the energy of localities and communities. There is much activist and third sector work in civil society at local and community levels that contributes to and could anchor such a 'bottom-up' movement. However, this book is not an argument for anarchism. In a globalised world with several powerful, including predatory states, the nation state is not about to disappear. Yet, national government in liberal democracies *also* needs further democratisation, rather than increased centralisation of power as has been a recent tendency. It is clearly wrong that in Britain parties with millions of members are regularly deprived of anything approaching proportionate party representation in parliament because of the first past-the-post electoral system. And in the United States it is possible for a candidate in a presidential election to win the popular vote yet lose the election – because of an archaic electoral college system that is based on state representation. This perverse outcome occurred in 2016 when Hillary Clinton received more than 2 million votes than Donald Trump but lost to him in the electoral college. Reform of these undemocratic anomalies requires national legislation as do other pro-democratic policies as well as a range of social equality measures including, perhaps, a universal basic income (UBI). Accordingly, I argue here that to achieve radical democracy requires grassroots activists and left populist movements to cooperate with mainstream national social democratic and progressive parties to persuade them to adopt democratic reforms, including participatory democracy. Further any radically progressive vision must urgently address the threat of climate change and planetary well-being. In other words, it must be a vision for humanity and the environment. A related aim of this book is to contribute to dispelling the pervasive pall of political and cultural demoralisation and confusion of recent years. This was brought about largely by the complex, convoluted and generally disastrous way neoliberalism (pp. 4–5) became entwined with right populism. However, I focus less on negative criticism than to advocate what positively can be done.

Democratic reform cannot be achieved without extensive public support, especially if the commanding heights of power are held by those indifferent or opposed to it. Accordingly, I highlight the struggle to extend democratic power through the micro to the macro levels. One of the causes of the turmoil of recent years lies in the limitations of representative democracy, including its tendency to allow the formation of unaccountable elites that operate largely beyond effective parliamentary control yet sometimes drawing in elected politicians for their own ends (Crouch, 2004, 2011). However, the aim is not to undermine representative

democracy, but rather to buttress and balance it by extending citizens' direct and practical involvement in democratic processes. The term 'radical democracy' is a general descriptor of this enhancement of democracy, a main feature of which is participatory democracy and other forms of direct democracy such as citizens' assemblies. With greater popular power would come increased input to policy, no doubt including social equality measures. I describe what the above goals and aspirations mean in concrete terms as I develop the argument.

Themes and Questions

The relationship between populism and liberalism and the case for radical democracy are explored in this book through the following themes:

liberalism – hegemony and crisis;
the populist challenge(s) to liberalism;
the rise and challenges of new social movements;
combating reactionary nationalism;
constructing a participatory and progressive future.

The relationships between these themes is central to understanding the main political and social developments of a crisis ridden and fractious period and of finding a way out of it. However, this is not a straightforward collision between two clearly defined ideologies. There are varieties of liberalism and populism that in some instances interact positively as well as negatively. There were also other political ideologies involved in the conflicts of the opening decades of the twenty-first century, prominently socialism and various elements of far-right ideology such as neo-Fascism and white supremacism that tended to operate in the hinterland between illegal and legal political practice. The relationship of these ideologies to political parties is discussed later in this introductory chapter.

Each of the themes listed above suggest many questions. Readers may well ask their own and should find relevance to them in what follows. The questions below are the main ones I pursued in relation to each of the above themes.

Why, from being the hegemonic ideology, did liberalism go into crisis?

What do populists want that liberalism is not providing?

What part do/can social movements play in a progressive revival?

Why is nationalism often so important to right populists?

What might a participatory democratic and progressive future, look like, for the planet as well as the species?

These questions are considered throughout the book. The first question listed is addressed more specifically in the concluding pages of this chapter and in Chapters 3 and 6; the second question in Chapters 2 and 6; the third in Chapters 2, 5 and 8; the fourth especially in Chapters 4 and 5; and the fifth in Chapters 6, 8 and 9. The political and ideological implications of Covid-19 and climate and planetary issues are discussed in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 comments on major trends examined earlier and challenges readers to do the same.

Key Concepts in Relation to Themes and Questions

This section introduces key concepts used throughout the book and how they connect to liberalism and populism. More detail and references are given in context in the relevant chapters. However, basic definitions are given here for a reason. Liberals and populists disagree with each other but also among themselves. These concepts are tools for working through the arguments.

Liberalism: Neoliberalism and Progressive Liberalism. Hegemony

The term liberalism is used here in respect to two main trends in liberal thought and practice. The first is neoliberalism and the second is progressive liberalism. Neoliberalism is an ideology based on the belief that capitalism is the best foundation for modern societies and that the state, other than performing basic functions, mainly maintaining law and order, should interfere only minimally with the 'free market' (Hayek, 1944). In contrast, progressive liberals see a major role for the state in regulating and investing in the economy and in providing a system of social welfare for citizens. I have included 'cosmopolitan liberalism' as a strand within progressive liberalism although, like neoliberals, cosmopolitan liberals support globalisation and tend to favour low trade tariffs. However, they are progressive in that they advocate a more social democratic version of globalisation based on human rights and a more interventionist social justice role for the United Nations (see Giddens, 2001). Neoliberalism and progressive liberalism are distinctive but the enthusiasm of the former for capitalism and the qualified acceptance of it by the latter facilitates sometimes uneasy co-existence and some ideological 'cross-over'. That said, neoliberalism developed as the hegemonic ideology from the early 1980s and is still very influential despite the rise of economic nationalism. Highly competitive capitalism is quite compatible with assertive nationalism.

Hegemony refers to social control through cultural means or 'soft power' rather than through force. Hegemonic control develops in civil society through education and the media which in Marxist perspective are considered to convey the values of the capitalist class but are also as areas of potential struggle. However, the concept that people are socialised to conform to a given social system is generally accepted in social science (see pp. 8–9). Neoliberalism began as an intellectual movement and, although not always acknowledged by name, its influence percolated widely throughout society.

Populism

Populism in its simplest form is an ideology that opposes 'the people' to the 'elite' or 'elites'. 'Left' populism does so typically by inclining towards socialism and 'right' populism generally towards 'nationalism', typically with some element of social reform to meet popular demand and need. Both left and right populism express desire for communal identity, the former partly through democratic participation, sometimes referred to as 'anarcho-populism', and the latter through

a notion of national community and often also through nostalgic localism. The next chapter examines various theories of populism and discusses their disagreements as well as the important but limited areas they have in common. Ideologies do not emerge 'pure' from the minds of social philosophers but reflect real social context and change. Marx's socialist theories were a response to capitalism, Edmund Burke's conservatism to what he saw as social disorder and its human cost. Populism was a reaction to the failures of hegemonic neoliberalism to shape societies across much of the world in a way that satisfied their citizens. Although they were not necessarily even aware of the name social scientists had given to the discourse of neoliberalism that so affected their lives. How effective populism was and may still be is a large part of what this book is about. There is no doubting its impact and influence. In the next chapter, I give more emphasis than I am aware is made elsewhere that populism is a cultural trend and form that may outlast the still strong presence of political populism.

Social Movements: Relationship to Populism

Social movements are not identical with populist movements. Social movements pursue specific causes that activists believe are ethically just. Examples of social movements are the labour movement, feminism, the black liberation movement and the LGBTU movement/s. As stated above, a commonly accepted basic definition of populism is that it pitches the people against the elite. An influential approach to left populism is that the above and other reforming social movements could combine to 'construct a people' and collectively form 'a frontier' of opposition to elites (Mouffe, 2018). The possibility of collective action would greatly increase the bargaining power of social movements in relation to the specific issues of individual movements as well as common issues. Thus, Extinction Rebellion has identified climate change as of existential concern and as such it has the power to motivate other activists. Such a level of co-operation might be especially helpful in sharing and acting upon issues of intersectionality, particularly where people suffer double jeopardy from discrimination or oppression – for instance as black and female. The potential for widening such a radical front exists with the emergence of a new generation of environmentalist and anti-climate change groups, such as Extinction Generation (EG), and assertive anti-racist movements such as Black Lives Matters (BLM). These movements, although not age based, bring a new energy and vision to the struggle for radical and progressive change.

Social Stratification and Identity Concepts in Relation to Neoliberalism and Populism

The core concepts or 'tools' used to analyse the division of modern societies into broad strata are class, sex and gender, race and ethnicity, and age and generation. These inform analysis throughout this book and specific usage is made clear in

context. Race and ethnicity are discussed in a separate section following this one, given the role they play in populist attitudes to immigration. However, political movements produce their own perspectives or make assumptions about social divisions and the identities they carry. I deal with this aspect next.

Ideological assumptions about social stratification are intrinsic to both neoliberalism and populism. As far as class is concerned neoliberal assumptions are straightforward. Primarily an economic theory based on the role of markets, neoliberals regard class stratification and social inequality as the natural outcome of competition for scarce resources, including jobs, and similarly social status and identity are viewed mainly in relation to occupational status. Unsurprisingly, the impact of neoliberalism on finance and business practice helped to create a class of the super-rich whereas the income and wealth of middle sections of society have tended to stall over an extended period (Piketty, 2014, 2020; Stiglitz, 2017). Transnational companies led and benefitted from neoliberal globalisation which provided opportunities for access both to cheap labour sectors and to more skilled ones, contributing to increasing profit and to their owners and senior executives power within the global elite. It is no coincidence that the global high-tech entrepreneurs Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Bill Gates of Microsoft are the world's two richest people (Forbes, 2020). As far as I am aware, neither these two nor perhaps many multi-billionaires consciously subscribe to neoliberalism which is an academic theory, but they fit the mould. Neoliberal 'common-sense' that life is naturally competitive and produces unequal outcomes seldom prompts serious concern that people are not equal 'at the starting line' or that the state should substantially intervene to set this right. However, within competitive business and professional environments, discrimination on gender or race/ethnic grounds is increasingly rejected, at least in principle, and anti-discrimination measures introduced as legally required. However, hyper-masculine cultures persist as the steady flow of gender discrimination cases, including of bullying demonstrate.

Although, primarily a political ideology, dividing society into two opposing groups, the people and the elite, populism is also a basic stratification theory, distinct from Marxism by locating power in an elite rather than a ruling class. As far as gender is concerned, the authoritarian ethos of right populism tends to throw up stereotypically masculine assertive and dominant leaders although there are exceptions (see pp. 29–30). In Eastern Europe strong religious belief and traditional notions of 'the man' as 'the leader' produce a brand of stiff, uncompromising masculinity of which Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary is an example. Left populism is gender democratic by conviction although the most prominent leaders of Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece are men.

The rise of neoliberalism and populism had considerable impact on stratification theory, perhaps most notably in stimulating a revival in elite theory (Crouch, 2004; Di Muzio, 2015). It is not easy to reconcile the concept of elite in populist theory with ruling class as it does not significantly draw on class theory. Dividing 'the people', or 'mass', to use a common term in elite theory, into classes

as Charles Wright Mills did seems a necessary further differentiation of the concept of 'the people' (1956). However, Guy Standing merges elite theory and Marxist perspective in the broad concept of an emerging 'mass class' that he also refers to as 'the precariat' (2014). Insecure in work or other income support and lacking in effective political representation, the precariat includes the low-paid and insecure sectors of the domestic labour market and migrant labour but also, in an age in which technology can replace increasing numbers of professional and other member of middle class, this sector as well. Mills' seminal work, *The Power Elite* (1956) still offers theoretical insight on elite/mass theory as well as revealing his own neo-populism (see pp. 86–87).

Recession, student debt and the impact of Covid-19 has also brought the position of young people in the system of stratification to attention, particularly in relation to career and social mobility opportunities (Howker & Malik, 2013). I have a research interest in young people as potential carriers of social change and that possibility has come into play in recent years and is a recurrent point of consideration below (O'Donnell, 2007, 2010, 2018).

Racialism and Racism. Ethnicity. Immigration

The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines racialism and racism as follows:

> Racialism is the unequal treatment of a population group purely because of its possession of physical or psychological or other characteristics socially defined as denoting a particular race … Racism is the deterministic belief system which sustains racialism linking these characteristics with negatively valuated social, psychological or physical traits.
>
> (2009, p. 626).

The above definition includes real or perceived cultural features as possible objects of racist targeting. Thus, antisemitism and Islamophobia are racist although rational criticism of any or all religions is not racist. Racist attitudes can lead to racial discrimination and although this is against the law in Britain and widely elsewhere, it can be difficult to prove. The terms labelling and stereotyping occur in the context of racism and discrimination (as well as in other forms of attributing negative characteristics to a given population group or member of it). A racial stereotype is a predetermined fixed view that a population group or member of it has certain negative racial characteristics as defined above. To label a group or individual in a racist way is to define them in terms of racial characteristics and is likely to have negative social consequences for them – as it did for black people during the slave trade and in many other situations and for the Jews as victims of pogroms and the holocaust.

Institutional racism occurs when the culture of an organisation is racist and therefore likely to be discriminatory. Institutional racism has for decades been an

issue in relation to selection procedures in respect of race and ethnicity. Although illegal it can be difficult to prove that prejudice and discrimination have played a role in selection. Due to ubiquitous presence of CTV and popularity of mobile phone with camera facilities, incidents of racist discrimination among the police are sometimes relatively easy to pick up but, of course, this does not necessarily lead to unbiased official response. In 2020 in the United States several such incidents were recorded on video by members of the public, involving police violence and victim fatalities. Tragic though these incidents were, they inspired a swell of creative protest and positive action from within and beyond the black community. This is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

The above definitions clarify that within social science race is perceived as a social construct. Characteristics associated with race are often imagined and can emerge distorted out of frustration, anger or hatred and other negative feelings. History tells that they can lead to the worst of human behaviour.

Populism and Liberalism's Relationship to Other Ideologies and Political Parties

Ideology

This section sets out populism and liberalism in relation to a broader spectrum of major political ideologies and to the political parties they are associated with. The section is introductory – prior to later more detailed treatments. The *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics* gives the following definition of ideology as: 'Any comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world may be referred to as an ideology' (OCDP, 2018, p. 271). Some might question the term 'mutually consistent' in relation to the ideas of certain ideologies but adherents to given ideologies generally believe they are logical and a valid. The OCDP continues: 'Catholicism, Islam, Liberalism, and Marxism are examples'. So are neoliberalism and populism. These are all distinct ideologies and there are many more. Another way of understanding ideology is to see it as the various 'stories' that the historian Yuval Noah Harari suggests people need in order to make sense of their lives and find some orientation to the future (Harari, 2015). Like stories, ideologies provide emotional and moral meaning as well as explanations, factual or imagined, of, for instance, the meaning of existence, or the sources of oppression. Unsurprisingly, major ideologies, notably those that are global in scope, invariably produce subdivisions. For instance, there are varieties of Christianity and Islam and as indicated above, liberalism and populism.

The term political ideology refers to the values, beliefs, sentiments and aims of a political group, movement or party. However, political ideologies reflect the social context in which they develop. The Marxist tradition argues that in class divided societies the ideology of the dominant class functions as a false justification for its own interests that obscures the reality of class oppression and exploitation. Thus, in Marxist accounts, liberalism is seen primarily as a veneer for capitalist class interests whereas socialism is regarded as a necessary collective